Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff: Is There a Limit by Gulino, Frank
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 6 | Number 2 Article 2
1978
Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff: Is There a Limit
Frank Gulino
fgulino2@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Accounting Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank Gulino, Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff: Is There a Limit, 6 Fordham Urb. L.J. 217 (1978).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol6/iss2/2
COMMENTS
LEGAL DUTY TO THE UNBORN PLAINTIFF:
IS THERE A LIMIT?
I. Legal Duty in the Law of Negligence-An Historical
Overview
Two of the elements essential to any actionable negligence are the
existence of a "legal duty"' owing to the plaintiff by the defendant,
and a breach of that duty.2 This breach may consist of either affirm-
ative negligent acts or negligent failures to act,3 but some duty
owing to the plaintiff must be present for that plaintiff to maintain
an action against the negligent defendant.4 The defendant's legal
duty to the plaintiff extends only so far as that plaintiff has a correl-
ative right by reason of his relationship with the defendant.' Beyond
the scope, therefore, of a particular right vested in the plaintiff, the
defendant owes him no legal duty.' Where there is no duty, there
can be no breach and, consequently, no cause of action for negli-
gence .'
This Comment will trace the history of the legal duty requirement
in prenatal injury cases and examine the factors, such as increased
medical knowledge, which contributed to its expansion and evolu-
tion. In addition, it will examine the various approaches used by
courts in deciding whether to grant a cause of action for prenatal
injuries. Finally, this Comment will analyze the recent decisions in
1. "Legal duty" has been defined as "[tihat which the law requires to be done or forborne
to adeterminate person or the public at large, correlative to a vested and coextensive right
in such person or the public, and the breach of which constitutes negligence." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1039 (4th ed. rev. 1968). Cf. People v. McGreal, 4 111. App. 3d 312, 321, 278 N.E.2d
504, 510 (1971). " 'Legal duty' is that which the law requires be done or forborne by [i.e.,
to] a determinate person." Id., citing Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 13 Ill. App. 91, 98 (1883).
2. F. WHARTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 3, at 3 (2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter
WHARTON]. The other elements of actionable negligence are "[ilnadvertence" and "injury."
Id.
3. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 507 (1883).
4. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. v. Bingham, 29 Ohio St. 364, 369 (1877).
5. See note 1 supra. See also WHARTON, supra note 2, § 24, at 17.
6. Western Md. R.R. v. Kehoe, 83 Md. 434, 451, 35 A. 90, 94 (1896) (citing Kahl v. Love,
37 N.J.L. 5, 8 (1874)).
7. Id.
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which a legal duty was found for preconception negligence and will
discuss, in connection with the present state of medical knowledge,
some of the ramifications which this extension of legal duty may
have on future prenatal injury litigation.'
A. To Whom Is A Duty Owed?
It has been noted that "[iun civil issues the right to enforce [a
legal] duty must reside in individuals,"9 in "persons determi-
nate."' 0 Indeed, there has been virtually no change in the definition
of legal duty since Dr. Francis Wharton wrote those words in his
famous treatise on negligence in 1878:"1 now, as then, the duty must
be owed to a determinate person" in whom some coextensive right
has vested before an action in negligence will lie. This rule was
followed steadfastly by courts in many early negligence cases. 3 The
United States Supreme Court, in articulating the rationale for the
limitation on actionable negligence imposed by the requirement of
legal duty, 4 expressed a fear which would be echoed, either ex-
pressly or impliedly, in nearly all of the subsequent opinions deny-
ing recovery for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries: 5
"[This] restriction on the right to sue for [negligence] in the exer-
cise of employments . . . is plainly necessary to restrain the remedy
from being pushed to an impracticable extreme."'" Without the
8. Since they are separate and distinct from actions for personal injury, this Comment
will not, for the most part, deal with so-called "wrongful death" actions, which owe their
existence or non-existence to state statutes and not the common law.
9. WHARTON, supra note 2, § 24, at 17.
10. Id.
11. Compare the definition of "legal duty" in WHARTON, § 24, at 17, with the definition
of that term in the most recent edition of BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, quoted at note 1 supra.
12. According to the prevailing Americar view (see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 18.2, at 1018-19 & 1019 n.4 (1956)), a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff, or a member
of a foreseeable class of plaintiffs, would qualify as a "determinate" person. See id. at 1018.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 281(b) (1965).
13. See, e.g., Crane Elev. Co. v. Lippert, 63 F. 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1894); Toadvine v.
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 20 F. Supp. 226, 227 (E.D. Ky. 1937); Salmon v. Delaware, L.
& W. R.R., 38 N.J.L. 5, 11 (1875); Brown v. Boorman, 11 Cl. & F. 1, 44, 8 Eng. Rep. 1003,
1018-19 (H.L. 1844); Ferguson v. Earl of Kinnoull, 9 Cl. & F. 251, 289, 8 Eng. Rep. 412, 426
(H.L. 1842).
14. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 202 (1879).
15. See, e.g., Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 359, 78 S.W.2d
944, 949-50 (1935).
16. 100 U.S. at 202.
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restraint of legal duty, the Court said, "[t]here would be no bounds
to actions [for] negligence . ... 1
B. Legal Duty and the Unborn Plaintiff
Reflecting an adherence to the letter of the law, courts found that
a child could not maintain an action for prenatal injuries since, at
the time of the alleged infliction of injury, it was not a person and
therefore could be owed no duty.9 The original position of American
courts, 9 enunciated in 1884,0 was that a child en ventre sa mere is
merely a part of its mother,2 a non-entity2 which could enjoy legal
rights and legal personality only after birth." And even when courts
expanded the notion of who was a "determinate person" within the
definition of "legal duty," unborn children were denied a right of
action for their prenatal injuries.
In 1928, the New York Court of Appeals decided "the most dis-
cussed and debated of all torts cases."24 In Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad,25 the court held, in the now famous opinion by Chief Judge
Benjamin N. Cardozo, that duty in a negligence action extends only
to those persons within a definite area of danger.26 Judge William
S. Andrews, author of the equally famous Palsgraf dissent, said that
17. Id.
18. Some of the cases relying on the absence of duty as a basis for denying recovery for
prenatal injuries are cited in note 96 infra. See also Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95
N.E.2d 206 (1950).
19. See text accompanying notes 57-59 infra.
20. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (per Holmes, J.).
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id. at 16. Cf. Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798), wherein the court,
in reply to the contention that a devise for the life of a child en ventre sa mere was void
because the unborn child was a non-entity, said:
Let us see, what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a recovery, though
it is for the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may be an executor. He
may take under the Statute of Distributions. . . . He may take by devise. He may be
entitled under a charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction; and he may
have a guardian.
Id. at 163 (citation omitted).
23. Even today, the right of action for prenatal injuries is dependent upon the plaintiff's
survival of birth; only thereafter do the rights of a person accrue to him under the law. See
Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579, 587 (1965). See also text accompanying
notes 124 & 137 & note 140 infra.
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 43, at 254 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
PROSSER].
25. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
26. Id. at 343, 162 N.E. at 100.
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"[d]ue care is a duty imposed on each one of use to protect society
from unnecessary danger, not to protect [determinate plaintiffs]
alone,""1 but he noted that "[a]n unborn child may not demand
immunity from personal harm."28
This position was "relied upon as dispositive and controlling" 9
until 1946, when a federal district court held that a fetus "capable
of living outside the womb" 0 was a person3 and had a right of action
in negligence "for injuries wrongfully committed upon its person
while in the womb of its mother."32
By 1972, the District of Columbia and every state which con-
fronted the issue had recognized some right of action in a child for
its prenatal injuries.3 Some jurisdictions even recognized that right
of action from the moment of the plaintiff's conception, 34 extending
27. Id. at 349, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting),
28. Id. at 348, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J. dissenting) (citing Drobner v. Peters, 232
N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921)).
29. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946).
30. Id. at 140.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 142.
33. E.g., Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972); Scott v. McPheeters, 33
Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, aff'd per curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (1939) (decision based on statute);
Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955);
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.
Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Horn-
buckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Rodriquez v. Patti,
415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960) (recog-
nizing rule under Iowa law); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Cooper v.
Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923) (civil-law decision); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197
Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d
912 (1960); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971); Rainey v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953);
White v. Yup , 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d
108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y.
349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Jorgensen v. Meade
Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'g 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla.
1972) (applying Oklahoma law); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955);
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d
222 (1966); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); Shousha v. Matthews
Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand &
Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967); Seattle.First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d
288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962); Panagopoulos v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969)
(declaring West Virginia law); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d
163 (1959).
34. See cases cited in note 138 infra.
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personality-and legal duty-to the newly-conceived fetus. 5 In
these jurisdictions, the restraint of legal duty had been extended so
that the law would recognize the human being from its earliest
moment of prenatal life as a separate entity in esse.11
In 1973, a federal circuit court granted a cause of action for inju-
ries sustained as the result of negligent acts committed before the
conception of the plaintiff, when it could in no way be argued that
plaintiff was "in being" at the time of the defendant's allegedly
tortious conduct.37 The court dispensed with the requirement of
legal duty38 in its effort to arrive at a just decision precisely because
there could have been no feasible argument for calling someone not
yet conceived a "determinate person." 9 But four years later, the
Supreme Court of Illinois reaffirmed the concept of legal duty.10 In
a dramatic decision,4 the court extended legal duty to defendants
who committed negligent acts eight years before the conception of
the plaintiff,42 finding in the child a coextensive "right to be born
free from [foreseeable] prenatal injuries."43
II. Rights of the Unborn Plaintiff: The Great Contradiction
A. Rights of the Unborn Plaintiff at Common Law
The law has long recognized and protected the interests of unborn
children." In 1765, Blackstone, in his Commentaries,5 wrote:
35. Medically, the term fetus refers to "the developing young in the human uterus after
the end of the second month [of pregnancy]. . . . [Ilt becomes an infant when it is com-
pletely outside the body of the mother ... " DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEMCAL DICTIONARY 547
(24th ed. 1965) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DORLAND's]. But for the purposes of this
Comment, the term fetus will be used to denote the unborn child throughout its prenatal life.
Cf. the definitions of zygote and embryo, id. at 1723, 478-79.
Although personality has been extended to the newly-conceived fetus, birth is still the
donor of legal personality and legal rights. See note 23 supra. But see section'VIII infra.
36. One court went so far as to say that the finding of the unborn plaintiff to be in esse
was "beside the point." See note 141 and accompanying text infra.
37. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'g
336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972). See notes 161-68 and accompanying text infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 167 & 168 infra.
39. See note 1 supra.
40. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (1977).
See also text accompanying notes 201-06 infra.
41. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), aff'g 40 111. App.
3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
42. See text accompanying notes 184-87 infra.
43. 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
44. In Wallis v. Hodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 472 (Ch. 1740), an English court, relying on Roman
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An infant in [sic] ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed
in law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a
surrender of a copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned
to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take
afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born.4'
One English court went so far as to say that children en ventre sa
mere "are entitled to all the privileges of other persons." 7
American courts took the same view when they began to adopt the
English common law rules of property. In 1834, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts confronted the issue of whether a child
born almost nine months after the death of its grandfather was
entitled to share in the grandfather's bequest,'" which was to be
shared by any grandchildren of the testator "as [might] be living
at [his] decease." 9 The court said that a child was to be considered
in esse throughout its prenatal life,"0 holding that "a child en ventre
sa mere is a person [and] is to all intents and purposes a child, as
much as if born in the [grandfather's] lifetime."'"
B. "Part of Its Mother": The Rule of Dietrich v. Northampton
Though an unborn child was considered a person from its concep-
tion for the purpose of various property rights, it was not so in the
law of torts. With the first American prenatal injury case, 5 there
developed an inconsistency in the law which allowed an unborn
civil law, held that a posthumous child (one born after the death of its father) was entitled
to an accounting of its father's estate. The court stated that "both by the rules of common
and civil law, [the unborn child is), to all intents and purposes, a child, as much as if born
in [itsl father's life-time." Id. at 473. Following the reasoning in Walis, the court in Doe v.
Clarke, 126 Eng. Rep. 617 (C.P. 1795), interpreted the meaning of "children" in a will to
include a child en ventre sa mere. Id. at 618. Still earlier cases include Marsh v. Kirby, 21
Eng. Rep. 512 (Ch. 1634) (gift of rents and profits to a child en ventre sa mere held to be
valid); Hale v. Hale, 24 Eng. Rep. 25 (Ch. 1692) (posthumous child held to be within the
meaning of a trust created for children of testator who might be living at his death); Burdet
v. Hopegood, 24 Eng. Rep. 484 (Ch. 1718) (gift over to testator's cousin in case testator should
leave no son at the time of his death held not to have taken effect owing to birth of posthu-
mous son).
45. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs (1765) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
46. Id., vol. 1, at *130.
47. Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 164 (Ch. 1798) (emphasis added).
48. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834).
49. Id. at 257.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 258. Compare this quote with the quote from Wallis v. Hodson at note 44 supra.
52. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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child to enforce its rights in certain property, but which afforded the
child no remedy for the often permanent physical injuries it suffered
while in its mother's womb. Fifty years after it held that a child in
the womb of its mother was a person for the purpose of inheritance,"3
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that no cause of
action could lie for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries upon
a fetus. In Dietrich v. Northampton,5 Massachusetts' highest court
dealt with a wrongful death action"5 brought under the following set
of facts: a woman about five months pregnant fell on the defen-
dant's defective highway, went into premature labor, and gave birth
to a child which survived for only "ten or fifteen minutes."56 Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, delivering the opinion of the court, cited
the lack of precedent in favor of such an action. He said that "no
case, so far as we know, has ever decided that, if the infant survived,
it could maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its
mother's womb."57 Justice Holmes concluded that "the unborn
child was a part of [its] mother"58 at the time of the infliction of
the injury which caused its death, and he held that no civil duty
could be owed to one not yet in being. 9 That decision remained the
undisputed law in every American jurisdiction for the next sixty-two
years."0
Walker v. Great Northern Railway Co. of Ireland,"' decided in
1891, greatly enhanced the impact of the Dietrich rule. In Walker,
a pregnant woman was negligently injured while a passenger on
defendant's railway. As a result, it was claimed, the woman's baby
was born with permanent injuries. The court discussed in great
53. See Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834), and text accompanying note 51
supra.
54. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
55. Although wrongful death actions are separate and distinct from actions for personal
injury (see note 8 supra), it is one of the great ironies of the law relating to prenatal injuries
that decisions in this field for more than half a century (see text accompanying note 60 infra)
were based, not upon a prior personal injury decision, but upon the decision in this wrongful
death action.
56. 138 Mass. at 15.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. at 16.
60. See the discussion of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), which flatly
rejected the rule in Dietrich, in the text accompanying notes 102-16 infra.
61. 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891). Indeed, this was the first case in which the plaintiff infant
survived his prenatal injuries.
1978]
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detail the cases and commentaries relating to the status of the un-
born child at common law.2 But despite its acknowledgement of the
common law decisions which held that unborn children were enti-
tled to all the privileges of other persons, 3 the Walker court con-
cluded that the defendant, as a carrier, owed a duty only to its
passenger, the mother, and not to her unborn child. 4 Although Jus-
tice William O'Brien, in a concurring opinion, said that he would
see "[no] injustice in the abstract in . ..an action [for prenatal
injuries] being held to lie,"" the passage of his opinion which be-
came so often quoted by proponents of what became known as the
Dietrich- Walker rule" was: "[O]n what a boundless sea of specula-
tion in evidence this new idea [of allowing a cause of action for
prenatal injuries] would launch us." 7 The court in Walker was
obviously not prepared to enter upon that "sea of speculation."
Instead, this influential decision served to reinforce and perpetuate
the rule in Dietrich" which said, in effect, that, in the eyes of the
law, the unborn plaintiff was not a person to whom a duty could be
owed.
The American case which overshadowed Dietrich in many ways
was Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital." In that turn of the century
Illinois case, the minor plaintiff alleged that he had suffered perma-
nent physical injuries as the result of the negligent operation of a
hospital elevator in which his mother was a passenger while he was
a viable unborn child."0 The Supreme Court of Illinois concurred7
62. See, e.g., id. at 73. See also notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
63. 28 L.R. Ir. at 73. See note 47 and acompanying text supra.
64. 28 L.R. Ir. at 79. This ruling by the Walker court was instrumental in the denial of
the cause of action in Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367
(2d Dep't 1913). See notes 86-92 and accompanying text infra.
65. 28 L.R. Ir. at 81 (O'Brien, J., concurring).
66. See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries,
110 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 554, 561 (1962).
67. 28 L.R. Ir. at 81 (O'Brien, J., concurring). See, e.g., Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R.,
154 App. Div. 667, 672, 139 N.Y.S. 367, 371 (2d Dep't 1913); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 353, 78 S.W.2d 944, 946 (1935). ,-
68. See cases cited in note 67 supra. See also Note, supra note 66, at 559.
69. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), aff'g 76 Ill. App. 441 (1898). The case was "cited as
an authority in almost every [prenatal injury] case thereafter .... " Stemmer v. Kline, 19
N.J. Misc. 15, 19, 17 A.2d 58, 60 (Cir. Ct. 1940). It became "a leading case on the subject
[of prenatal injuries]. . . . cited and followed by courts of review of many .. .jurisdic-
tions." Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 103, 19 N.E.2d 446, 448 (1939).
70. The injury to the child in Allaire was alleged to have been inflicted ten days before
the birth of the infant plaintiff. 184 Ill. at 360, 56 N.E. at 638.
[Vol. VI
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with the view expressed in Dietrich that no precedent existed for
granting the cause of action sought by the unborn plaintiff.72 The
court went on to express in the clearest terms the rule which every
subsequent decison cited in denying a right of action for one's prena-
tal injuries:73 "[A] child before birth is, in fact, a part of [its]
mother, and is only severed from her at birth. . . ."I' The court
noted that there was no authority for holding that a legal duty can
be owed to that which is not in esse in fact,75 so as to render some
negligent act a breach of that duty and thus actionable at law.7
III. "Natural Justice": The Fetus Becomes a Person
A. The Allaire Dissent
The first, and for many years the strongest, challenge to the basic
premise of the Dietrich case was made by Justice Carroll C. Boggs
of the Illinois Supreme Court in his Allaire dissent.77 Justice Boggs
did not contradict Justice Holmes' opinion in Dietrich, but inter-
preted it as holding that no duty of care could be owed to the infant
in Dietrich because it "was too little advanced in foetal life to sur-
vive its premature birth,"" He was then able to distinguish Allaire
from the Dietrich case by seizing upon the concept of viability, that
period of intrauterine development when an infant is able to live
outside its mother's womb,79 and finding that the fetus in Allaire
had a separate existence-and was thus owed a duty-from the
moment of viability."0 In so finding, Justice Boggs held that a child
who is born alive should have a right of action for the prenatal
injuries it sustained while a viable fetus."' In an opinion noted for
71. In fact, the supreme court's per curiam opinion consisted almost entirely of the opin-
ion of the appellate court below. See 184 Ill. at 365-68, 56 N.E. at 639-40.
72. Id. at 367-68, 56 N.E. at 640.
73. See, e.g., cases cited in note 18 supra & note 96 infra.
74. 184 Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
75. Id. The validity of the argument which states that to regard a child as a person for
property rights was a "fiction" indulged in by the law was challenged as early as 1798 in
Thellusson v. Woodford, quoted at note 22 supra. See also text accompanying notes 88-89
infra.
76. See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
77. 184 11. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 372, 56 N.E. at 642 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
79. See the definitions of "viability" and "viable" in DoRL.ND's, supra note 35, at 1689.
80. 184 Ill. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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its "independent and logical thought," 2 Justice Boggs laid down the
influential foundation for the argument that the law should keep
abreast of medical advances8 3 when he said:
[lIt is but to deny a palpable fact to argue there is but one life, and that
[it is] the life of the mother. Medical science and skill and experience have
demonstrated that at a period of gestation in advance of the period of parturi-
tion the foetus is capable of independent and separate life, and that, though
within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of her body. .... .1
Justice Boggs questioned a common law which would regard a
prenatal injury as having been inflicted upon a human being if the
child had died as a result, but which, if the child survived the injury,
would deny the infant the right to recover damages occasioned by
it by denying the infant's very existence. 5 He was not alone in his
disagreement with the common law. In 1913, the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court, Second Department," rejected the
notion that an unborn child, though considered a person and enti-
tled to protection of his property rights, was "not in existence" for
the purpose of protecting his physical and mental health. Disagree-
ing with the Allaire majority's view that recognition of the unborn
child's existence for its benefit in the law of property was "a mere
legal fiction," 8 the appellate division said that "[ilt is not helpful
to characterize [the unborn child's] existence as fictitious as to
property rights. The rights are accorded to it. "I' The court critically
analyzed the result at common law which protected the rights of
ownership but which disregarded the safety of the owner. 0 "In such
argument," the court stated, "there is not true sense of proportion
in the protection of rights. The greater is denied; the. . . lesser...
82. Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 674, 139 N.Y.S. 367, 372 (2d
Dep't 1913).
83. Compare Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946), quoted in text accom-
panying note 116 infra.
84. 184 Ill. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 372, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
86. Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (2d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 209 N.Y. 515, 102 N.E. 1107 (1913). In this case, the defendant was charged
with negligently starting a railway car while plaintiff's mother was getting off. The mother
fell, and, thirty-six days later, the plaintiff was born with severe physical and mental injuries.
87. 154 App. Div. at 672, 139 N.Y.S. at 370.
88. 184 Il. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
89. 154 App. Div. at 672, 139 N.Y.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 672, 139 N.Y.S. at 370-71.
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is respected."'" But the New York court's words were dictum," and
for nearly fifty years after it was written, Justice Boggs' Allaire
dissent 3 failed to convince even one jurisdiction to allow a cause of
action for prenatal injuries."
B. Bonbrest v. Kotz: The Viable Fetus is a Person to Whom a
Duty May be Owed
In the years following the Allaire decision,95 American courts of
review were unanimous in denying the right of action for prenatal
injuries." But lower courts were beginning to find great fault with
the reasoning of the courts which denied that right." In 1924, a
Pennsylvania trial court granted a cause of action to a child who was
en ventre sa mere at the time of the alleged infliction of injury." The
court pointed out that "[miodern scientific research in the domain
of embryology has demonstrated that the foetus is an identity inde-
pendent of the mother." 9 Thus, it held that "an unborn child who
91. Id. at 672, 139 N.Y.S. at 371.
92. The Nugent court, despite its strong dictum against the rule in Dietrich, indicating
that it would probably favor a catise of action in an ordinary case of prenatal injuries, ruled
against the infant plaintiff on the narrow ground that a carrier can owe no duty of care to an
unborn child, but only to the child's mother, the passenger,- to whom the carrier owed a
contractual obligation. 154 App. Div. at 673, 139 N.Y.S. at 372 (citing Walker v. Great N.
Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891)).
93. See notes 77-85 and accompanying text supra.
94. But see cases cited in notes 98 & 101 infra.
95. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
96. See, e.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926);
Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo.
126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Berlin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901);
Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935); Lipps v.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
97. See Nugent, cited at note 86 supra (dictum); Drobner v. Peters, 194 App. Div. 696,
186 N.Y.S. 278 (1st Dep't), rev'd, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Cooper v. Blanck, 39
So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923) (civil-law decision not published until 1949).
98. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (Dist. Ct. 1924).
99. Id. at 228. The court said further that the fetus
has its own independent blood circulation, and draws from its mother only the ele-
ments which nourish it and stimulate its growth. This in itself would require us to
disregard the common law rule which merges the mother and child into one being
during this period, and would justify us in advancing the time at which the child
acquires all the rights of an individual, and thus make the law conform with the fact.
Nevertheless, whether the assignment of a legal personality to the unborn child be
based upon scientific truth or upon legal fiction, the reason for the adoption of this
view is stronger when we are dealing with the health of the individual, and his ability
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receives injuries while quick in the womb, which are due to the
negligence of another, can, if it survive, maintain an action for the
damages which it suffers in life as a result of such negligence.' ' 00
But it was not until 1946 that a common law court of major
influence took issue with the Dietrich rule and dismissed it on its
face.' 0' In Bonbrest v. Kotz, '02 the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, echoing the "strong dissent"' 03 by Justice
Boggs in Allaire, distinguished Dietrich from the case before it by
stressing the viability of the child in the case at bar. The court
pointed out that Holmes, in his Dietrich opinion, denied that a right
of action for prenatal injuries existed in "an infant dying before it
was able to live separated from its mother. " 04 The child in Bonbrest
was a viable unborn child"5 which, by definition,00 indicates an
ability to live separate from the protection of its mother's womb.0 7
In addition, the Bonbrest court contradicted the "difficulties of
proof" 08 argument enunciated in Walker'5 by calling it no argument
at all."0 The Bonbrest court also reinforced the idea, first put forth
in the Allaire dissent,"' which influenced every court that followed
its rejection of the Dietrich decision: " "The law is presumed to keep
after birth to seek his complete happiness and perform his full duty as a citizen and
member of society, than when we are dealing merely with his property rights.
Id.
100. Id. at 230 (emphasis added). The unborn child is said to be "quick in the womb"
when it makes its first recognizable movements in utero, usually from the sixteenth to the
eighteenth week of pregnancy. DORLAND'S, supra note 35, at 1261 ("quickening"). It is notable
that one of the meanings ascribed to the term quick is "Alive." Id.
101. A few earlier decisions had contradicted the Dietrich rule, but with litle influence
on courts in subsequent prenatal injury cases: Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92
P.2d 678, affd per curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (1939) (decision based on statute); Cooper v. Blanck,
39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923) (civil-law decision); Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille,
[1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (civil-law decision).
102. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
103. Id. at 139 n.3 (citing Allaire).
104. Id. at 140 (quoting Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16) (emphasis added by
the Bonbrest court).
105. 65 F. Supp. at 140.
106. See DORLAND'S, supra note 35, at 1689.
107. Id. See also Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. at 141.
108. See note 203 infra.
109. 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891).
110. 65 F. Supp. at 143.
111. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
112. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il1. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); Smith
v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125
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pace with the sciences and medical science certainly has made prog-
ress since 1884 [when Dietrich was decided]. ' ' H3
So, in 1946, the law finally recognized something which had ac-
tually been known for many years, certainly before the Dietrich case
was decided: a viable fetus is not merely "a part of [its] mother,"! 4
but is a distinct entity, capable of life. And for the first time, a court
utilized scientific facts to show the separate nature of the fetus and
its mother,"5 and struggled with notions of "natural justice.""'
In truth, there was ample medical and legal knowledge available
at the time Dietrich was decided which would have supported a
granting of the cause of action in that case. More than a century
before, Blackstone had stated that "[1]ife is the immediate gift of
God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins
in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the
mother's womb.""' 7 Furthermore, it was known in 1860 that the
unborn child was sometimes capable of movement in its mother's
womb as early as ten weeks following conception, and that such
activity was generally begun by the end of the fourth month of
intrauterine life."' If, as Blackstone stated, life begins in the eyes
of the law as soon as the infant is able to stir in the womb, then in
all probability the plaintiff in Dietrich, and most certainly the
plaintiff in Allaire, should have been deemed living beings at the
time of the infliction of their injuries, and the courts in those cases
should have found that, as such, a legal duty was owed them.
C. A New Rule Takes Hold
After Bonbrest"9 there was a wave of cases granting a cause of
action for prenatal injuries to a viable fetus. 20 Without restraint,
courts began to reject the doctrine of nonliability established by the
N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953).
113. 65 F. Supp. at 143.
114. Cf. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17; Allaire, 184 Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
115. See Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140-41 & nn. 8, 11, 13 & 14.
116. Id. at 142.
117. BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, vol. 1, at *129.
118. 1 T. BECK, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 277 (11th ed. 1860).
119. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
120. See, e.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909
(1951); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953)(overruling Allaire); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152
Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
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Dietrich decision.' 2 The Dietrich rule, which stated that the unborn
child was but a part of its mother, 2 gradually came to be replaced
by one which recognized the medical knowledge available to courts
regarding prenatal development. As one writer put it, "[t]he fact
is that the infant lives with its mother while in its prenatal state,
rather than being 'a part of the mother'. . ".."I, The new rule
adopted by courts concerned itself with the viability of the unborn
plaintiff and the separate existence which a viable child has from
its mother. In short, courts had begun to declare that a viable fetus
who survived birth was a person to whom a duty could be owed and
in whom there existed the right to bring an action for negligently
inflicted prenatal injuries. This modern position has been followed
by all of the jurisdictions which have considered this issue.2 4
IV. The Impact of Medical Knowledge Upon the Law: The
Abandonment of Legal Duty
A. The Biological Approach: The Viability Rule is Rejected
As the law began to take notice of the growing body of available
medical knowledge, the erroneous belief that viability constituted
the origin of separate being fell under increasing criticism. Medicine
emphasizes that the crucial period of prenatal development during
which the fetus would be most susceptible to environmental influ-
ences is the first trimester of pregnancy, long before viability.2 5
Indeed, there is substantial medical authority that certain congeni-
tal defects occasioned by environmental factors can be sustained
only within the earliest stages of previable development.' Increased
121. 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884). See text accompanying note 59 supra.
122. 138 Mass. at 17. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
123. Gaines, The Infant's Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries, 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 518, 524
(emphasis added).
124. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 55, at 336. See Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465
(E.D.S.C. 1960); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters, 33
Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939) (decision based on statute); Tursi v. New England
Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955); Tucker v. Howard L.
Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197
Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87
N.E.2d 334 (1949); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955); Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
125. See, e.g., E.M. HETHERINOTON & R. PARKE, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 58-59 (1975)
[hereinafter CHILD PSYCHOLOGY].
126. It has been noted that "t]he vulnerable period for the nervous system is from
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medical knowledge as to the effects of irradiation,' the causes of
certain infectious diseases' 8 and the importance of nutritional fac-
tors'9 and blood disorders 30 indicate that healthy fetal development
may depend upon factors existing at the time of, or even prior to,
conception.' 3' Therefore, a viability limitation on the right of action
presented a potential of working injustice. This injustice becomes
manifest when it is realized that the results of the negligent actor's
conduct are the same whether the fetus was viable or not.
Not many years after the Bonbrest case, courts came to regard the
viability limitation as not only unjust but unworkable. There was
an increasing awareness that the concept of viability is highly rela-
tive, and that expanded knowledge and improved care have length-
ened the period during which the fetus can survive outside the
mother's womb.'32
In 1953, a New York appellate court became the first court to
expand the right of action for prenatal injuries to allow a surviving
infant to bring an action for injuries it sustained while a nonviable
fetus.'3 Taking a biological approach in arriving at its decision, the
fifteen to twenty-five days [after conception], for the eye from twenty-four to forty days, for
the heart from twenty to forty days, and for the legs from twenty-four to thirty-six days
.. " Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
127. See Epstein, Medical Genetics: Recent Advances with Legal Implications, 21 Has-
tings L.J. 35, 46 & n.62 (1969). See also Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579,
616 (1965).
128. CHILD PSCYHOLOGY, supra note 125, at 60.
129. See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal
Injuries, 110 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 554, 582 & n.182 (1962).
130. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 125, at 57, 60-61.
131. Genetic characteristics in the mother at the time of conception "may play an impor-
tant role in the appearance of abnormalities" in the unborn child. Id. at 59. The cause of
action in Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., discussed in text accompanying
notes 155-68 infra, was predicated on a change in a mother's chromosomal structure, allegedly
due to the negligence of the defendant, which occurred prior to the conception of the plaintiff.
483 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir. 1973).
Other conditions existing in the mother at the time of or prior to conception may affect
fetal development. For instance, "[tihe increase in miscarriage and infant . . . mortality
rates are directly correlated with the degree of high blood pressure in pregnant women [and]
[ilnfants of diabetic mothers have a relatively high proportion of infant mortality and
abnormalities .... " CHILD PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 125, at 60.
132. It is possible, though most unusual, for an infant born premature after only six
months of intrauterine life to survive. Id. at 57. And, as one court stated it, "age is not the
sole measure of viability, and there is no real way of determining in a borderline case whether
or not a fetus was viable at the time of the injury, unless it was immediately born." Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
133. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953). New York
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court in Kelly v. Gregory 3' said that legal separability-the exist-
ence of a distinct being, separate from its mother, to whom a duty
can be owed-should be recognized from the moment of biological
separability. '3  That moment, the court found, occurs at concep-
tion. 3 ' In so finding, the New York court held that an injury sus-
tained "at any period of [its] prenatal life" is actionable by a
surviving infant, so long as he can prove the effect of the tort on
him. 37
B. The Causative Approach: Liability Without Duty
Today, some fifteen states, have come to recognize, either ex-
pressly or impliedly, a right of action in the unborn plaintiff, ir-
respective of its viability at the time of the negligent infliction of
injury.'38 But a common theme developed from the Kelly case which
indicated a total abandonment of the requirement of legal duty, one
courts have been consistently at the fore of progressive movements in the law relating to
prenatal injuries. It was a New York court which rendered the first majority opinion question-
ing the basic premise of the Dietrich- Walker doctrine of nonliability. See Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (2d Dep't 1913) (dictum). It was a New York
court which was the first to directly contradict and reject the Dietrich rule. See Drobner v.
Peters, 194 App. Div. 696, 186 N.Y.S. 278 (1st Dep't 1921) (reversed on appeal). New York
was one of the first states to follow the landmark decision in Bonbrest. See Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). And the New York Supreme Court was the first state
court to grant a cause of action for prenatal injuries caused by preconception negligence. See
Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 60 App..Div. 2d
80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977). See also notes 170-79 and accompanying text infra.
134. 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S:2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953).
135. Id. at 543, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
136. Id. at 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
137. Id. at 545, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968) (by implication);
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951) (language
recognizing right of action not limited to viable fetuses); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218,
178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926
(1967) (by implication); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971); White
v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969) (viability not mentioned in statement of rule);
Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157
A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953); Gay
v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966) (recognizing rule without mentioning
viability); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76,
220 A.2d 222 (1966); Delgado v. Yandell, 468 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.), appeal denied per
curiam, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288,
367 P.2d 835 (1962) (viability not mentioned in statement of rule); Kwaterski v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
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of the essential elements of any" actionable negligence.,"9 Courts
began to echo that portion of Kelly which said that the prenatal
injury will be actionable "[i]f the child .... can prove the effect
on him of the tort . ... 110 This focus on causation allowed the
courts to avoid a consideration of the legal status of the fetus and
required only the establishment of a causal link between the defen-
dant's wrongdoing and the resultant injury to the plaintiff. Duty
thus became a "non-element" of the tort, and a finding that the
fetus is a "person in being" became "beside the point.' 4'
Employment of this causative approach had several positive ef-
fects on the law relating to prenatal injuries. It all but destroyed the
medical and logical inaccuracies of the viability rule, 42 thus protect-
ing the unborn plaintiff from the moment of its conception. 43 And
while it led to a demise of the legal duty element of negligence, the
causative approach gave courts the opportunity to articulate a pre-
natal right of the unborn plaintiff, 14  one which has had and will
continue to have significant ramifications in this area of law: 45
"[J]ustice requires that the principle be recognized that a child has
a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body."'49
V. The Courts Turn Full Circle: Liability Can be Owed to One
Not Yet in Being
As early as 1956, at a time when courts were just beginning to
139.. See.text accompanying notes 17 Tsupra.
140. Compare 282 App. Div. at 545; 125 N.Y.S.2d at 698 with Hoinbuckle v. Plantation
Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 504-05, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956) ("If a child born after an injury
sustained at any period of its prenatal life can prove the effect on it of a tort, it [has] a right
to recover."); with Daley v. Meier, 33 111. App. 2d 218, 224, 178 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1961) ("[An
infant, who was born alive and survives, can'maintain an action to recover for prenatal
injuries, medically provable as resulting from the negligence of another, even if it had not
reached the state of a viable fetus at the time of the injury."); and with Bennett v. Hymers,
101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958) ("[Uf a child born alive after an injury sustained
at any period of its prenatal life can prove the damage was caused by the tort it makes out a
right to recover .... ").
141. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
142. See notes 125-32 and accompanying text supra.
143. See cases cited in note 138 supra.
144. If courts continue to recognize in the unborn the "right to be well born," they will
be able to find a correlative duty owing to the unborn, making any negligent act which causes
an infant to be born with some defect actionable at law. See the definition of "legal duty,"
supra note 1. See also sections VII & VIII infra.
145. See section VIII infra.
146. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
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overturn the viability limitation on the right of action for prenatal
injuries, there was an attempt, in a federal court action,'47 to extend
that right of action even further than was allowed in Kelly v.
Gregory. 4 Specifically, in Morgan v. United States, 49 recovery was
sought for injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff as the result of
allegedly injurious conduct which occurred more than two years
before the infant was born. The United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, applying Pennsylvania law, 50 denied the
cause of action because the prevailing Pennsylvania case at that
time flatly denied recovery for any prenatal injuries."'
A different result might well have been reached had Morgan been
decided four years later. In 1960, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
overruled its pre-Bonbrest decision," 2 finding that the fetus has a
separate existence "from the moment of conception."'5 3 Moreover,
the supreme court noted that all of the cases upon which it had
relied in its pre-Bonbrest decision had since been either expressly
overruled or strictly limited in their application.'54
Despite these changes in the law after Morgan, the next federal
court to examine the issue (of whether an infant could maintain an
action for injuries it sustained as the result of tortious conduct
which occurred before it was conceived) made its decision, not on
the basis of the recent trend in the law, but upon Morgan. In
Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., "I the United States
147. Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956).
148. 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953). See text accompanying notes
133-37 supra.
149. 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956).
150. The alleged tort in Morgan occurred in Pennsylvania, and whether a cause of action
accrued to the plaintiff is governed by the law of that state. Id. at 584. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1970).
151. See Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
152. Id.
153. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960).
154. Id. at 269, 164 A.2d at 94. The court in Berlin, cited at note 151 supra, decided its
case on the authority of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich
v. Northampton, 138-Mass. 14 (1884); Ryan v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 18 N.J.
Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
By the time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Sinkler in 1960, those cases had been
overruled or strictly limited by the following cases: Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d
412 (1953); Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (limiting
Dietrich to wrongful death actions involving nonviable fetuses); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J.
353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
155. 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sustained the
defendant's motion to dismiss the action, citing Morgan' and
Walker 7 as precedent.'58 The district court not only ignored the
shift in the law in the sixteen years since Morgan, but apparently
took no notice whatsoever of the long line of cases emanating from
Bonbrest59 which had destroyed the applicability of the Dietrich-
Walker rule. h8 °
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the lower court ruling in Jorgensen,' becoming the first
American court to allow a cause of action for preconception negli-
gence. In that case, it was alleged that the plaintiffs, twin girls, were
born Mongoloids as the result of their mother's use of the defen-
dant's oral contraceptive product before they were conceived.' The
complaint alleged that the defendant company was liable for its
negligent manufacture of the product, and for breach of its express
and implied warranties that the product was safe for human con-
sumption.8 3 As to the novelty of granting a cause of action for
"preconception injury,"'64 the court of appeals said that, although
the mother's chromosome structure was injuriously altered prior to
the conception of the plaintiffs, the injury to the plaintiffs did not
(and indeed could not) occur until after they were conceived." 5
Moreover, the court said:
If the view prevailed that tortious conduct occurring prior to conception is
not actionable in behalf of an infant ultimately injured by the wrong, then
an infant suffering personal injury from a defective food product, manufac-
tured before his conception, would be without remedy. Such reasoning runs
counter to the various principles of recovery which [the law] recognizes for
those ultimately suffering injuries proximately caused by a defective product
or instrumentality manufactured and placed on the market by the defen-
dant.'
156. 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956).
157. 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891). See text accompanying notes 61-68 supra.
158. 336 F. Supp. at 962-63.
159. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). See note 124 supra.
160. See text accompanying notes 57-58 & 61-68 supra.
161. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
162. 336 F. Supp. at 961-62.
163. 483 F.2d at 238-39.
164. Id. at 239.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 240.
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The focus of the Jorgensen court, like that of so many courts since
Kelly v. Gregory,'6 7 was upon causation. The court of appeals was
correct when it said that to sustain the cause of action upon a
finding of causation would be in accord with "the predominant view
that an action may be maintained for prenatal injuries negligently
inflicted if the injured child is born alive."'6 8 But it was also correct
when it said that, though the negligent manufacture of the injury-
causing product predated the plaintiffs' conception, the injury to
the plaintiffs was sustained by them only after conception. And it
has long been accepted that the fetus is a person to whom a duty
may be owed from the moment of conception.'
Then, in 1976, the New York Supreme Court became the first
state court to deem "viable"' 70 an action by a" 'child' after its birth
for 'conscious pain and suffering' based upon a tort committed upon
it prior to its conception."7' In Park v. Chessin, "I the Trial Term
of the New York Supreme Court for Queens County held that the
parents of a deceased two and one-half year-old child had a cause
of action, on the child's behalf, for the preconception malpractice
of the defendants, two specialists in the field of obstetrics. The
complaint alleged that the doctors failed to inform the parents of
the risk that the child would be born with the same congenital
defects which had appeared in and caused the death of the mother's
first child.'73 The plaintiff-child was born suffering from the same
congenital disease that had afflicted her sibling, and the plaintiff,
too, died as a result of that disease. In granting the cause of action,
the Park court found that a medical specialist can be held accounta-
167. 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953). See cases cited in note 140
supra.
168. 483 F.2d at 240.
169. See text accompanying notes 133-37 supra.
170. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 229, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd,
60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977). The term "viable" in this context
should not be confused with the concept of fetal viability, discussed in the text accompanying
note 79 supra. The Park court's repeated use of the term is undoubtedly as a synonym of the
word "maintainable."
171. 88 Misc. 2d at 229, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (emphasis in original).
172. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977). Moreover, it was alleged that the doctors affirmatively advised
the child's parents that the chances of the second.child being born with the congenital
polycystic kidney disease which caused the death of the first child were " 'practically nil.'"
Id. at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
173. 88 Misc. 2d at 224-25, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 206-07.
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ble for negligent acts committed by him before the plaintiff was
conceived. It said that "'[i]t makes no difference how much time
elapses between a wrongful act and a resulting injury if there is a
causal relationship between them.' "I" The court found that the
causal link between the defendants' malpractice and the plaintiff's
injuries had been sufficiently established;' and, since the defen-
dants' advice encouraged the mother to become pregnant, the court
found that the resulting child was foreseeable to them. 7 ' Equating
foreseeability with duty, the court held that the plaintiff had stated
a valid cause of action. In effect, the law had turned full circle in
the ninety-two years since Justice Holmes' opinion in Dietrich v.
Northampton:'7 courts had begun to find that a man might indeed
"incur .. .liability in tort to one not yet in being."' 78 Unfortun-
174. Id. at 227, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (quoting Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 11. App. 2d 240, 250,
190 N.E.2d 849, 853 (1963)) (emphasis added by the Park court).
175. 88 Misc. 2d at 227-28, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 208. The court rhetorically asked: "Why...
should not the plaintiff decedent be permitted to hold these defendants in damages, since
the defendants' wrongful acts are alleged to have caused the procreation of the being whom
they intended and ultimately injured .. .[?]" Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
178. Id. at 16. On December 12, 1977, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the trial term in Park v. Chessin. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977). The cause of action relevant to this Comment, that made on
behalf of the Parks' dead second child, was upheld by the appellate court in what is likely to
become a most controversial opinion. The court determined that the complaint stated a valid
cause of action for "wrongful life," becoming the first court of review to so hold. The contro-
versy lies in the concept of "wrongful life" itself. For, in actions claiming such a count, the
wrong for which damages are sought is the very existence of the plaintiff. In the past, the
"wrongful life" cause of action has been rejected, inter alia, on the ground that it would be
impossible to determine that the infant involved would be better off non-existent than alive
(see Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 79-80, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937 (4th Dep't 1977))
and on the ground that the damages would be impossible of calculation (see Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28-29, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); Williams v. New York, 25 App. Div.
2d 907, 908, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966)). While the appellate division in Park noted this, 60 App. Div. 2d at
87-88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114, the court made no attempt to dispose of those issues in recog-
nizing the cause of action. If and when this case comes before the New York Court of Appeals,
then, the high court will have no legal reasoning from the opinions below upon which to base
a reversal of its past rejections of the "wrongful life" concept.
But the court of appeals need not decide the issue of "wrongful life" in Park v. Chessin.
The holding of the appellate division does not rest upon the "wrongful life" issue at all. It
merely states that "the portion of the complaint which seeks recovery on behalf of the
[deceased] infant for injuries and conscious pain and suffering caused by defendants' negli-
gence should be permitted to stand." Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114. Indeed, the court
addressed itself to a right which has been gaining recognition in actions for prenatal injuries:
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ately, in recognizing a right of action for preconception negligence,
the Park court did not adequately address itself to the exact limits
of the duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiff. If that duty is
the "right to be well born." See notes 144-46 and accompanying text supra & notes 243-44
and accompanying text infra. The court said that the defendants' negligence "may . . . be
said to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human
being." 60 App. Div. 2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (emphasis added). It would be sufficient
if the court of appeals decided an appeal in the Park case on traditional prenatal negligence
grounds, while considering the more novel issues of whether a cause of action may lie for pre-
conception negligence and whether the so-called "right to be well born" is cognizable at law.
This would be consonant with the analysis of the concurrence in the appellate division. See
id. at 88-89, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (Cohalan, J. Pres., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
The dissent, however, argued that the action in Park is one for "wrongful life," regardless
of the claim that damages were being sought "for injuries and conscious pain and suffer-
ing," and that such actions had been rejected by the appellate division in the past. Id. at
92-93, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 117 (Titone, J., dissenting). To support its view, the dissent. cited
cases wherein the parents, but for the defendants' alleged negligence, would have aborted the
children involved. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting) (citing Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp.,
35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 238 N.E.2d 616,
332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 App. Div. 2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (2d
Dep't), appeal denied, 37 N.Y.2d 707, 337 N.E.2d 618, 375 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1975)). But those
cases are distinguishable from Park v. Chessin. The appellate division in Stewart, for in-
stance, said that "the cause of action by the infant plaintiff for the defendant hospital's
failure to abort her mother [i.e., her mother's pregnancy] and thus terminate [the plain-
tiff'sf life is not cognizable at law ...... 35 App. Div. 2d at 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d. at 503
(emphasis added). In Park there was no question of the defendants' failure to terminate the
existence of the plaintiff after conception, and the court was thus not lending its support to
such a result when it upheld the infant's cause of action. The Park infant's complaint, unlike
that of the infant plaintiff in Stewart, did not assert a breach of duty owed to her parents (in
this case, the duty to the parents being one to render accurate medical advice as to whether
to conceive another child). Nor did the Park infant, unlike the infant in Stewart, claim in
any way that her life should have been terminated at some time prior to birth. The claim of
the Park infant was solely for the injuries, pain and suffering she sustained during her life. It
was the claim of the parents, also plaintiffs in the case, and not the child, that they should
have been given the opportunity not to bring a second child into the world: "'Had the par-
ents known of the substantial possibility of [the second child being born with the same
disease as caused the death of their first child] they would not have conceived [that second
child]'." 60 App. Div. 2d at 94, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (Titone, J., dissenting) (quoting plain-
tiffs' affirmation opposing defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint) (emphasis added
by Justice Titone).
The Park complaint clearly states a cause of action for negligence according to the classic
formulation of Chief Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf, which has been the law of New York for half
a century. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 1018-19 (1956). In Park, both the plaintiff and the risk of injury
were within Cardozo's "orbit of foreseeable risk." A duty was owed by the defendant doctors
to conduct themselves in such a manner as would avoid the sustaining of foreseeable harm
by the child. The right of the infant plaintiff to be well born should be recognized, and for
the violation of that right, the plaintiff should be given access to legal remedy via a cause of
action for negligence.
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deemed to be the same duty owed to the child's parents-to have
prevented the conception of another congenitally ill child-a proble-
matic result would follow: had the defendants fulfilled that duty to
the plaintiff, said plaintiff would never have come into existence!
However, if the duty owed to the Park child is analyzed as a duty
to see that the child be "well born," then allowing the cause of
action seeking compensation for the injuries which accompanied the
child's birth would be well within the power of the court.179 Then,
too, there would be no derogation of the precept that "[n]o liability
can arise . . . except out of a duty disregarded."'' 10
VI. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital: A Reaffirmation of Legal
Duty
A. Liability for Preconception Negligence
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Illinois handed down a decision'
which could signal a radical change from the way courts tradition-
ally view the concept of legal duty as it relates to the law of negli-
gence.' In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,' Illinois' highest court,
in a four to three decision, granted a cause of action to an infant
plaintiff for the prenatal injuries which were allegedly the result of
negligent acts committed against its mother eight years before the
infant was conceived. By so deciding, the Illinois Supreme Court
became the first state court of last resort to recognize a right of
action for preconception negligence.
The complaint in Renslow alleged that in October of 1965, when
plaintiff's mother was thirteen years old, the defendants, a hospital
and its Laboratory Division chief, twice transfused the mother,
whose blood type was and is A-Rh negative, with A-Rh positive
blood.'84 It was further alleged that, as a result of those transfusions,
179. See note 178 supra. See also notes 144-46 and accompanying text supra & notes 243-
44 and accompanying text infra.
180. Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 224, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921).
181. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
182. See section Vu infra.
183. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), aff'g 40111. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
184. 67 Il1. 2d at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251; 40 I1. App. 3d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871. The
rhesus, or "Rh," factor is defined a "a-substance or one of a group of substances that is
present in the red blood cells oft a large majority of persons . . . and is capable of inducing
[an] intense [negative] reaction under suitable circumstances (as in repeated transfusion
of Rh-positive blood to an Rh-negative person) .... " WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1947 (unabr. ed. 1964) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. The precise "suitable circum-
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the mother's blood was sensitized, causing prenatal damage to
plaintiff's hemolytic processes when it was conceived eight years
later."s5 Finally, plaintiff alleged that the damage to her hemolytic
processes endangered her life, necessitating her induced premature
birth and two complete transfusions of her blood shortly there-
after." ' Plaintiff sought damages for her injuries, which included
permanent damageto her brain and nervous system." 7
stance" posited by the editors Of WaSTER's as inducing an intense reaction, the "repeated
transfusion of Rh-positive blood to an Rh-negative person," occurred in the Renslow case. For
a discussion of the "intense reaction" to the transfusions in Renslow, see note 185 and
accompanying text infra.
185. 67 Il. 2d at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251; 40 Ill. App. 3d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871. The
introduction of Rh-positive blood into the plaintiff's mother made her blood susceptible, or
"sensitized," to hemolysis, the destruction of red blood cells through the loss of hemoglobin,
the agent in red blood cells which transports oxygen through the blood.
The process of sensitization has been described as follows:
Rh blood incompatibility is the most . . . destructive [of blood incompatibilities].
The incompatibility between an Rh-positive baby and an Rh-negative mother can
cause. . . infant death through erythroblastosis, a destruction of the red blood corpus-
cles resulting in an inadequate supply of oxygen to the fetus. Antigens are produced
in the blood of the Rh*positive fetus and transmitted through the placenta to the blood
of the Rh-negative mother; toxic antibodies are produced in the mother's blood and
are returned to the infant [sic], resulting in erythroblastosis .
CHILD PSYCHOLOaY, supra note 125, at 61 (emphasis in original).
In Renslow, the plaintiff asserted that defendants discovered that they had administered
incompatible blood to plaintiff's mother, but, that they at no time informed the mother or
her family. 67 Ill. 2d at 349: 367 N.E.2d at 1251. The mother herself was never aware that
she had been improperly transfused, and she was certainly never aware of the sensitization
which took place in her blood as a result of the defendants' transfusions, until it was discov-
ered during a routine blood test after she became pregnant eight years later. 40 Ill. App. 3d
at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871. By that time, the unborn child had contracted hemolytic jaundice.
Id. See text accompanying notes 186-87 infra.
The following are definitions of some of the medical terms used in this note:
antigen . . . [A substance], which, when foreign to the blood stream ........
stimulates the formation of. . . antibod[ies]....
erythroblastosis [fetalis] . . . [A] hemolytic anemia of the fetus . . . . caused by
the transplacental transmission of maternally formed antibody, usually secondary to
an incompatibility between the blood group of the mother and that of her offspring,
characterized by increased numbers of nucleated red cells in the . . . blood ....
hemolysis . . . [Tihe separation of [the oxygen-carrying agent of the blood] from
the corpuscles ....
hemolytic jfaundice] . . . [A] rare . . . generally hereditary disease characterized
by periods of excessive hemolysis due to abnormal fragility of the red corpuscles which
are small and spheroidal. ...
DORLAND'S, supra note 35, at 106, 511,663, 767 (emphasis added).
186. 67 11. 2d at 349-50, 367 N.E.2d at 1251; 40 Il. App. 3d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871.
187. Id. at 350, 367 N.E.2d at 1251; 40 Ill. App. 3d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871.
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The defendants contended that there was no right of action in the
plaintiff since they owed no duty of care to her in 1965."8 The sub-
stance of their argument was that the child was not yet in being at
the time of the transfusions to her mother; and that her injuries were
thus not reasonably foreseeable at that time. The trial court agreed
with the defendants and dismissed the complaint.
The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed," 9 finding "no logical
reason to deny recovery . . . simply because [the plaintiff] had not
yet been conceived when the wrongful conduct took place."' 9 The
court disagreed with defendants' contention that the plaintiff's inju-
ries were unforeseeable at the time of their allegedly negligent trans-
fusions. On the contrary, the appellate court found that the defen-
dants, since they were a hospital and a doctor, could reasonably
have foreseen that their thirteen year-o1d patient would marry and
bear a child who would be injured as the result of their improper
blood transfusions.' 19
The court further found that, under Illinois case law, a surviving
infant may recover for prenatal injuries sustained by it."92 That was
precisely the situation presented in Renslow. And, although the
court distinguished between past cases and the case before it,', 3 it
pointed out that in other areas of tort law, as long as duty and
causation could be proven, liability has not been barred simply
because the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred long before the
resultant injury.' 4 Thus, in a unanimous decision, the court granted
the plaintiff's cause of action and remanded the case to the trial
188. 40 111. App. 3d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871. Under then-existing Illinois case law, a child
might recover for prenatal injuries sustained at any time during the pregnancy of its mother.
Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). But the defendants argued that,
since the allegedly tortious conduct complained of occurred eight years before the pregnancy
of the plaintiff's mother, the complaint stated no cause of action. 40 Ill. App. 3d at 235, 351
N.E.2d at 871.
189. 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
190. Id. at 240, 351 N.E.2d at 874.
191. Id. at 239, 351 N.E.2d at 874.
192. Id. See Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962); Daley v. Meier,
33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961).
193. 40 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 351 N.E.2d at 872.
194. Id. at 239, 351 N.E.2d at 874. The court in this context cited Skinner v. Anderson,
38 111. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (negligerice in designing of ventilation system); Laukka-
nen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Il1. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E;2d 584 (1966) (negligence in construction
of supermarket pylon).
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court. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed,' 5 finding
that the defendants owed a duty to the minor plaintiff when they
improperly transfused her mother eight years before she was con-
ceived.
Although the supreme court affirmed the appellate court's ruling,
however, it disagreed with some of that court's reasoning. The su-
preme court, like the court below, found that the injuries to the
plaintiff were foreseeable at the time of the transfusions to its
mother.' But the supreme court substantiated its view by noting
the advance of medical knowledge in recent years. In finding that
plaintiff's prenatal injuries were reasonably foreseeable by the de-
fendants, the court declared that
[tihe basic understanding of Rh-negative and Rh-positive effects upon
hemolitic [sic] disease of the newborn has been a medical fact since the
1940's. . . . It has long been known that sensitization occurs in 90% of Rh-
negative women who have received multiple transfusions of Rh-positive
blood [and] that the Rh-positive fetus of an Rh-negative woman previously
sensitized is [borne by her] "at high risk." . . . Thus, it has been pointed
out that "it must be an absolute rule that Rh-positive blood is never trans-
fused to an Rh-negative female who is below the age of menopause.""'
The court also differed with what it called "Itlhe implication in
the appellate court's opinion that duty and foreseeability are identi-
cal . . . ..."I The supreme court cited two cases on point, namely
Jorgensen' and Park,2°° wherein the courts employed an approach
which focused upon causation in finding liability in negligence. The
Renslow court noted, however, that to find liability on the basis of
causation alone, absent an existing duty, would result in infinite
liability for all wrongful acts.20' While writers have denied that a
duty problem was ever real to the courts,' 2 the Supreme Court of
195. 67 I1. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
196. Compare 67 I1. 2d at 354, 367 N.E.2d at 1253 with 40 111. App. 3d at 239, 351 N.E.2d
at 874.
197. 67 Il1. 2d at 353-54, 367 N.E.2d at 1253 (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 354, 367 N.E. 2d at 1253.
199. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
200. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977).
201. 67 Ill. 2d at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
202. "In fact, considerations of duty are never the substantive reasons for a decision, but
only the legal sounding explanation for it." White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal
Injuries, 12 La. L. Rev. 383, 401 (1952). See also Payne, Foresight and Remoteness of Damage
in Negligence, 25 Modern L. Rev. 1, 18 (1962).
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Illinois reaffirmed the utility of the concept of legal duty as the
means to curb the potential flood of litigation in these cases, includ-
ing false claims, the fear of which has plagued courts for decades.' 3
The court found that, since a defendant, under existing law, may
be held liable to a person from the moment of his conception, °4 "it
[was] illogical to bar relief for an act done prior to conception
where the defendant would be liable for this same conduct had the
child, unbeknownst to him, been conceived prior to his act."2 5 The
court thus extended the duty owed to the plaintiffs mother at the
time of her transfusions to the child herself, finding in the child "a
right to be born free from [foreseeable] prenatal injuries . . 0
Finally, the court found support for its extension of duty in the
fact that medical advances have been achieved which can "mitigate
or, in some cases, totally alleviate a child's prenatal harm." 07 It is
clear from its opinion that the court deplored the negligent acts of
the defendants, but it cited "sound social policy" as the requiring
factor for the extension of duty in the case before it. 05 For the first
time in nearly a quarter century, a court had attempted to find a
duty owing to an unborn plaintiff. Clearly, however, there existed
no relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff in 1965
from which a duty could be said to arise,29 and only social policy
203. See, e.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
It has been noted that
difficulty of proof should not be a valid reason for ...denying recovery (since it is]
a question of evidence, and not one of tort. It would be far better to allow the
injured plaintiff to present his case for what it is worth, subject to all the safeguards
that have grown up in the evidentiary field, and under appropriate instructions from
the court regarding the legal weight of such evidence. Actual injury is surely capable
of clear medical proof, in view of the advanced state of medical science today. It is
entirely practical to allow recovery only on such clear proof, and deny it where the
claim is not proved. Under such circumstances, the possibility that speculative or
fraudulent claims will possibly be made . . .is simply one of adequate proof.
Note, Prenatal Injury: Recovery or Anomaly?, 14 Mont. L. Rev. 128, 134-35 (1953).
204. See cases cited in note 192 supra.
205. 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
206. Id. See section VIII infra.
207. 67 11. 2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
208. Id.
209. The requisite relationship between plaintiff and defendant may be merely the exist-
ence of the plaintiff in a foreseeable class of persons who might be endangered by defendant's
negligent conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 281(b) (1965). The possibility that
the thirteen year-old girl in this case would someday give birth to the plaintiff does not, of
itself, place the plaintiff within such a foreseeable class. See note 231 and accompanying text
infra.
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considerations could have enabled the court to find for the injured
child.
B. The Extension of Legal Duty: Reality or Fiction?
The three dissenting Renslow justices, in separate opinions,
strongly expressed the view that the possibility of disastrous social
consequences far outweighed any benefit which might accrue to the
plaintiff. Chief Justice Daniel P. Ward noted that granting the
cause of action in Renslow created problems, such as "how to mea-
sure the insurance risk" 10 and how to protect defendants from law-
suits generations hence for some genetic injury which was caused
many years before.2"
Justice Robert C. Underwood voiced the same fears.21 In his view,
the majority's finding that the defendants owed a duty to the plain-
tiff was unsubstantiated. He stated that "foreseeability is not con-
clusive as to the existence of a duty," ' and he advocated retention
of the rule limiting liability to "post-conception injuries."'
Justice Howard C. Ryan viewed the majority's decision, contrary
to its claim to have found a duty owing to the plaintiff,"5 "as a tacit
acceptance of causation as the sole determinant of liability."",6 He
said that the court's decision, admittedly based on social policy
considerations,"' was "symptomatic" of an increasing judicial tend-
ency to expand the traditional limits of tort liability.218 Justice Ryan
noted that "[a]n ever-broadening concept of duty has evolved" in
an effort to spread the cost of damages suffered by innocent persons,
bringing more and more plaintiffs under a "protective umbrella. ' 21,
In addition, he contended that, once plaintiffs were granted a cause
210. 67 I1. 2d at 371, 367 N.E.2d at 1261 (Ward, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Ward, C.J., dissenting). The majority's answer to this argument was that "the
case at bar [was] clearly distinguishable [from cases involving genetic injury]." Id. at 358,
367 N.E.2d at 1255. The court was "confident that when such a case [was] presented, the
judiciary [would] effectively exercise its traditional role of drawing rational distinctions,
consonant with current perceptions of justice, between harms which are compensable and
those which are not." Id.
212. Id. at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
213. Id. (Underwood, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Underwood, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 359, 367 N.E.2d at 1255-56 (per Moran, J.).
216. Id. at 374, 367 N.E.2d at 1263 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
217. See.note 208 and accompanying text supra.
218. 67 Ill. 2d at 378, 367 N.E.2d at 1265 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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of action under this umbrella, "sympathetic juries. . . have man-
aged to inflate the size of verdicts. '" '2 0 The justice deplored the result
which, in his opinion, the majority's holding was bound to have on
the general public: a significant increase in insurance costs and, in
turn, an increase in medical costs as well.'
VII. Ramifications of the Extension of Duty in Renslow
The potential adverse ramifications of the Renslow decision, as
expressed by that court's three dissenters, are very real possibilities.
Most telling was the observation by Chief Justice Ward that to
allow a cause of action for preconception negligence could lead to
"possible exposure of a defendant to claims by successive genera-
tions of plaintiffs who complain of genetic injury" as well." Simi-
larly, Justice Underwood recognized that extending duty to one not
yet conceived "permits a lawsuit to be filed 50 or 60 years after the
negligent act from which it arose." ' 3 Indeed, if the Renslow decision
were to be relied upon as precedent by other state courts, there
would be no limit to actions for prenatal injury. And the raison
d'etre of the legal duty requirement in actionable negligence 4
would be defeated.
This is perhaps the most disconcerting potential effect of the
extension of duty to the plaintiff in Renslow: that decision, like
Bonbrest v. Kotz25 and Kelly v. Gregory2 ' before it, could be the
beginning of a trend in the law, this one leading to potentially un-
220. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 371, 367 N.E.2d at 1261 (Ward, C.J., dissenting). This is not mere speculation.
It has been known for some time that irradiation, for instance, can cause "mutational changes
that may be transmissible to the descendants of the irradiated fetus." Gordon, The Unborn
Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579, 616 (1965).
223. 67 II. 2d at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262 (Underwood, J., dissenting). As another Renslow
dissenter explained:
If the mother in this case had received the transfusion at the age of two or three, if
she gave birth at the age of 40, and if the action were not brought until the child
reached majority, then nearly 60 years would have elapsed between the negligent act
and the institution of the suit. Under [the majority's] decision, [too], in cases where
certain deficiencies are passed from generation to generation, . . . a cause of action
[could] be maintained by any individual at any point in the chain of heredity.
Id. at 376-77, 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
224. See text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra.
225. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
226. 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1953).
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limited liability for birth defects. The history of the law relating to
prenatal injuries illustrates that when a court of major influence
expands the right of action at common law, courts across the coun-
try take the opportunity to expand that right in their jurisdictions
as well.2
It is not difficult to understand why the Renslow court decided
the case as it did. The danger of transfusing Rh-positive blood into
an Rh-negative woman is discoverable to any layman reading
Webster's Dictionary;211 the defendants in Renslow were a doctor
and a hospital. Surely they should be held to a professional standard
of care. But to say that the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff
at the time they injured her mother-eight years before she was
conceived-would be to ignore the facts. The defendants could not
have contemplated the unborn child of their thirteen year-old pa-
tient in 1965, as both the Appellate Court 2 1 and the Supreme
Court 130 of Illinois contended, any more than the thirteen year-old
girl herself could have contemplated giving birth to the plaintiff at
that time, though such occurrence was certainly in the realm of
possibility. "The creation of a legal duty requires more than a mere
possibility of occurrence. 2' 1 By the court's logic, a doctor would be
deemed to foresee as determinate, and thus owe a duty to, the future
227. See sections III(C) & IV(B) supra.
228. See note 184 supra.
229. 40 Il. App. 3d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 871.
230. 67 II. 2d at 365, 367 N.E.2d at 1258 (Dooley, J., concurring).
231. Cunis v. Brennan, 56 I1. 2d 372, 376, 308 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1974), quoted in Renslow
v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 I1. 2d 348, 376, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1264 (1977) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Justice James A. Dooley, in an opinion concurring with that of the court, attempted to
respond to the dissents by pointing out that, under existing statutory law, a statute of
limitations does not run against a minor, so that a suit could be insituted more than twenty
years after a negligent act without the Renslow decision. Id. at 370, 367 N.E.2d at 1261
(Dooley, J., concurring), citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 22 (1975). In addition, Justice Dooley
reminded the dissenters that, in the case of a defective product, no cause of action arises until
injury to the plaintiff. 67 Ill. 2d at 370, 367 N.E.2d at 1261 (Dooley, J., concurring). But
Renslow was not a products liability case, and, if it were, there would be no problem with
analogizing it to the Jorgensen case decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. See note
235 infra. Justice Dooley responded to the dissenters' fear of potentially unlimited liability
for genetic injury by saying that that issue was not before the court. 67 Ill. 2d at 370, 367
N.E.2d at 1261 (Dooley, J., concurring). In his words, "It is the duty of this court to address
itself to the issues presented by the particular litigation." Id. (Dooley, J., concurring). But
if, as he states, the decision of the court should turn solely upon the particular issues pre-
sented by the plight of the Renslow baby, so, too, should the holding of the court be limited
to the facts of that case. See text accompanying note 242 infra.
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children of a newborn girl when treating her in the delivery room.
A negligently inflicted injury to the newborn child, perhaps one
affecting her chromosome structure, 32 would make the doctor liable
not only to the infant herself but to any children she might have,
twenty or thirty years later, who were injured as a result.
While there should certainly be a public policy which favors the
protection of innocent, helpless infants, there must also be a strong
public policy upholding the reasonable expectations of individuals
that they not be exposed to limitless liability for an indeterminate
amount of time because of some inadvertent act. This is the reason
for the existence of statutes of limitations, and, specifically, it is the
reason for the relatively short duration of statutes of limitations for
negligence. 3
But the Renslow decision might have an unexpected effect on
future prenatal injury litigation: it may cause a contraction of the
currently recognized right of action which allows recovery from the
moment of conception. Legal duty does not exist merely because a
court extends it to the case at bar in order to arrive at the result it
seeks. There must be some relationship234 between plaintiff and de-
fendant from which the duty can be said to arise.235 And the plaintiff
must have some right which the actor has an obligation to protect,
which right defines the limits of the actor's duty.3 ' Contrary to the
Renslow court's contention,2 37 the possibility that plaintiff's mother
would someday bear children created no relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendants in 1965,238 when plaintiffis mother was
232. Long-term irradiation of the newborn, for instance, could be capable of producing
such a result. See note 222 supra.
233. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 211-214 (McKinney 1976). While certain actions
must be commenced within twenty, ten, or even six years (see id. §§ 211-213), actions for
negligently inflicted personal injuries or injuries to property must be commenced within three
years. Id. § 214. In the case of negligently inflicted injuries involving medical malpractice,
the limitation of time is even shorter-two years and six months. Id. § 214-a.
234. See note 209 supra.
235. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. In the area of products liability, cf. text
accompanying notes 161-66 supra, the requisite relationship between the unborn plaintiff and
the negligent defendant giving rise to a duty of care can certainly be found to exist, as it does
between any two parties in a products liability case. The reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in
Jorgensen (see notes 165-66 and accompanying text supra) thus can be said to have a sound
legal basis.
236. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
237. 67 11. 2d at 359, 367 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
238. See text accompanying note 231 supra.
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herself only a child, and no duty could be owed to the Renslow baby
at the time of the defendants' negligent acts. And since there can
be no actionable negligence in the absence of a duty owing to the
plaintiff by the defendants,239 other courts might look upon the
Renslow decision as an example of an irresponsible exercise of judi-
cial discretion. As a result, courts might be much more restrictive
in allowing actions for prenatal negligence in an attempt to halt or
reverse the trend toward unlimited liability.
VIII. Conclusion
The Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow took an important step in
reaffirming the utility of the concept of legal duty.24 The law cannot
continue to allow actions for negligence where two of the elements
essential to such actions-a legal duty to the plaintiff and a breach
of that duty-are lacking.24' But there must truly be a duty before
a finding of it can be made by a court. In Renslow there was no duty.
And if no duty is present, but the facts of the instant case demand
a finding for the plaintiff, a court should be able to rely on social
policy (which was, in fact, the basis for the Renslow decision)2 42 in
making a ruling limited to the facts before it.
It is unlikely, however, that courts will have to, or should have
to, rely solely upon social policy in granting causes of action for
prenatal negligence. For it would be a logical development of the
law if courts were to recognize, as a matter of law, the '.'right to be
born free from [foreseeable] prenatal injuries." '243 Such a right
would be correlative to the duty they would find owing to the plain-
tiff. This right has come to be called "the 'right to be well born.' "244
239. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
240. See 67 I1. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
241. If there is no legal duty, there can be no breach of duty. See text accompanying note
2 supra.
242. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
243. 67 I1. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. Compare this quote with Endresz v. Friedberg,
24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1969) ("[N]atural justice
...requires recognition of the legal right of every human being 'to begin life unimpaired by
physical or mental defects resulting from the negligence of another.") and Smith v. Brennan,
31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960) ("[Jlustice requires that the principle be recog-
nized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body.").
244. Ament, The Right to Be Well Born, 2 J. of Legal Med. 24, 27 (No. 6 1974). The right
to be well born has been defined as "the right of an unborn child to such prenatal care,
physically, mentally, and emotionally, as will maximize the unborn child's quality of life after
birth." Id.
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Recognition of it would make others liable in negligence for any
inadvertent acts or omissions which adversely affect the health of
the future child, providing it with the most comprehensive possible
protection from harm.
Recognition of such a right, however, would still leave open the
possibility of infinite liability, especially in the area of genetic in-
jury. To protect against this result, state legislatures would do well
to pass laws designed specifically to limit liability for prenatal negli-
gence. One way to accomplish this would be to limit liability to the
first generation injured by the negligence, allowing recovery for the
inability to conceive healthy children. The plaintiff would then be
on notice that his children would be born with the same genetic
defect and that conception of them would be at his own risk. An-
other way to limit liability for prenatal negligence would be to set a
strict limit on the number of years which may elapse between the
occurrence of the tortious act and the realization of the resultant
injury before the right of action on the negligence would lapse. 45 In
this way, only those cases with the best possible means of proof,
due to proximity in time, would come to court, lessening the chance
that false claims will glut our already overcrowded courts.
Some change must be made in the law relating to prenatal inju-
ries. While it is improper for courts to find negligence without legal
duty, it is equally improper to purport to find a duty where none
exists. With the knowledge of medical science presently available,
it would be' inpossible to deny protection against negligence to a
fetus from the moment of its conception. But until some definite
steps are taken to prevent unlimited liability for all negligent acts,
the law should not follow the precedent set in Renslow v. Mennonite
Hospital.246
Instead, legislatures should move to enact laws to define the lim-
its of the legal duty which may be owed to the unborn plaintiff.2 7
245. At least one state legislature has already passed such a law. Under an amendment
to New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, a child may no longer wait until three years
after reaching majority to commence an action for medical malpractice. The new law requires
an infant to commence an action for medical mapractice within ten years after the cause of
action accrues. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 208 (McKinney 1976), as amended by ch. 109, § 7,
1975 N.Y. Laws 134, 137. Thus, if an action for medical malpractice accrues to an infant aged
3, the child must'commence his action by the time he is 13.
246. 67 I1. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
247. See note 245 and accompanying text supra.
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Courts should prevent as much as possible the levying of excessive
damages against defendants in prenatal injury cases, balancing
compensation of the plaintiff at bar with the knowledge that exces-
sive verdicts will surely lead to higher insurance rates and an even-
tually greater burden to the public at large."' At the same time, the
law, either through the legislatures or the courts, should recognize
and enforce an infant's right to be well born,24 which would provide
the infant with legal recourse against preconception, as well as
postconception, negligence.25 ° For there is no reason why, in a proper
case, a cause of action for preconception negligence should not lie:
regardless of when the negligent act occurred, the injury to the
infant was sustained-and could only have been sustained-after
conception.25" ' And courts have been unanimous over the last quarter
century in holding that the unborn plaintiff, from the moment of
conception, is a person to whom a duty may be owed. 52
Frank Gulino
248. See text accompanying notes 218-21 supra.
249. See notes 144-46 & 243-44 and accompanying text supra.
250. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
251. See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
252. See text accompanying notes 133-38 & cases cited in note 138 supra.
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